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Japanese-owned banking institutions have dramatically
increased their share of the California banking market
since the early 1980s. However, the author finds that,
overall, the increase inforeignbankownership intheState
has been slight. Japanese bank expansion appears tohave
arisen primarily from the rapid increase in trade with
Japan and Japanese direct foreign investment in Califor-
nia. While Japanese banks emphasize commercial lending
and rely more heavily on purchasedfunding, they have a
substantial, and growing, retail presence in the State.
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Japanese banks have made significant inroads into the
California banking market since the early 1980s. Over the
period from 1982through 1988, assets of Japanese-owned
banking institutions in California increased nearly three-
fold. At the end of 1988, Japanese-owned banks held one-
quarter of the banking assets and over 30 percent of all
business loans in the State. This expansion has come about
through acquisitions and new entry, as well as through
rapid growth of existing institutions.
California is not the only market where Japanese banks
havemade inroads. World-wide, Japanese-owned banking
institutions have grown over the last decade and now
dominate the list of the world's largest banks. Their
overseas branches alone nearly doubled their assets from
1982 to 1987, reaching almost $1.1 trillion by year-end
1987.1
In California, in particular, this growth has received
considerable attention, raising concerns about its causes
and the possibility that with continued growth, Japanese
banks could come to dominate the California market. This
paper first examines the strong growth and increasing
market shares of two groups of Japanese-owned banking
institutions: commercial banks chartered in California and
the agencies and branches of Japanese banks that operate
in California. (A description of the banking powers and
services of these different types ofbanking institutions is
provided inthe BOX.) Section IIthen explores possible ex-
planations for the rapid growth of Japanese-owned bank-
ing institutions in California, and Section III examines
empirical evidence on growth patterns of banking institu-
tions to assess the potential causes of rapid growth. In
particular, empirical comparisons of the composition of
bank portfolios and funding attempt to determine whether
balance sheets of Japanese banks reflect the factors that
may be causing rapid growth. Section IV provides some
observations and conclusions about the Japanese banking
presence in California. Specifically, growth is likely to
continue, but at a slower pace, with more emphasis placed
on the "retail banking" area.
3I. Rapid Growth
The growthof Japanesebanks, agencies, and branches agencies, and branches in the State in 1982,rose to 25.2
in the mid-1980s intheU.S. hasbeenrapid. InCalifornia, percentby theendof1988.
the traditional measures ofmarket presence reflect that USiIlg a narrower definitionofthe banking market,
growth; assets, loans, and deposits all show dramatic that is, commercial banks only (excluding agencies and
increases. Between1982and 1988,theassetsofJapanese- branches), there still is a strong increase in the market
owned banking institutions in California nearly tripled, shareofJapanese-owned institutions. AsChart 1B shows,
growing from $34.6 billion to $93.4 billion.? As shown assetsof Japanese-owned banks rose from 3.7 percentto
in Chart lA, Japanese-owned institutions' market share, 11.9 percent of the "bank only" market from 1982 to
which was 10.7 percent of the total assets of all banks, 1988. 3 TheJapanese-owned commercialbanks morethan
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4 Economic Review / Summer 1989tripled their assets during the period, reaching $35.3
billion by year-end 1988. Sixty percent of this increase
resulted from acquisitions of three large foreign-owned
banks by Japanese-owned banks." However, Japanese-
owned banks in general also grew at a faster pace than did
other California banks.
Of the ten Japanese-ownedcommercial banks operating
in the State at year-end 1988, eight were subsidiaries of
Japanesebanks. Twosmall banks are Japanese-owned, but
are not owned by banks headquartered in Japan. The
subsidiary banks account for virtually all of the assets of
theJapanese-owned banks in the State. Fourof thesebanks
ranked among the top ten banks in the State at year-end
1988:Union Bank (fifth largest at $15.0 billion in assets),
Bank of California (sixth largest, $6.9 billion), Sanwa
Bank California (seventhlargest, $6.4 billion), and Sumi-
tomo Bank of California (ninth largest, $3.7 billion).
Earlier in the yearTokai Bank of California rankedtenth.5
The twenty-two foreign agencies and six foreign
branches of Japanese-owned banks more than doubled in
size over the 1982 to 1988 period. Their combined assets
reached $58.1 billion by year-end 1988. The agencies
($44.7 billion) and branches ($13.4 billion) provide an
array of commercial, money market, and trade-related
banking services, either directly or through international
banking facilities that serve only foreign residents. 6
Shifts in Market Shares
Although theincrease inJapanese ownership ofbanks in
the U.S. has raised concerns about "a wave" of Japanese
financial services acquisitions," expansion has not oc-
curred at the expense of domestic banks' market share in
California. Over the six years ending in 1988, the market
share of all foreign banking institutions increased only
modestly, from 30.8 percent to 31.7 percent. 8 As can be
seen in Chart lA, rather than gaining market share from
domestic banks, Japanese banks essentially havereplaced
other foreign banks asthedominant foreign banking power
in California.
In fact, using the narrow market definition, commercial
banks only, foreign market share actually declined from
20.2 percent in 1982 to 14.9 percent in 1988. Most of this
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 5decline resulted from the purchase of the British-owned
CrockerBank by WellsFargoBank in1986.9 Thisexplains
the sharp decline in "other-foreign bank" market share in
Chart lB. Thus, we have seen a shift, rather than an
increase, in foreign ownership.
II. Reasons for Expansion
This section examines a number of factorsthat mayhave
played a role in the growth of Japanese banking assets in
California. For example, the growth in tradewith Japan
and the growth of Japan's current account surpluses are
two factors that may have stimulated the growth of Jap-
anese banking institutions in California. Liberalization of
domesticcapitalmarkets inJapanisanotherfactorthatmay
have stimulated investment in the State. Finally, Califor-
nia's location, making it an important point of entry, as
well as the State's perceived attractiveness as a growing
banking market, are factorsthat mayhavehelped to set the
stage for the upsurge in investment in Japanese banking in
California. These considerations are discussed below.
Banks Follow Trade
One reason forthe growth in Japanese banking assets in
California may be the growth of US. trade with Japan.
Because of California's location on the Asia-Pacific Rim,
the State has become an important locus of trade-related
activity. With the increasing presence of Japanese-owned
multinational firms engaging in trade-related activities in
the State, there has been a commensurate increase in the
need for trade-related financing, exchange, clearing, and
other credit and banking services. Japanese-owned bank-
inginstitutions mayhaveacomparative advantage over the
US. and other competitors in providing these services. If
this is the case, it is logical that Japanese banking assets
would increase in the current environment of growing
trade with Japan.
A study of US. and Japanese banking by Henry Ter-
rell (1979) provides a theoretical and empirical basis for
suggesting that in the context of rapid growth in trade,
Japanese banks doindeed enjoy comparative advantages in
providing banking services in California.10 In this analy-
sis, Terrell adapts Caves' (1974) model of foreign invest-
ment to international banking. He notes that"... foreign
investment is often associated with product differentia-
tion, which may include possession of intangible assets
such as a firm's knowledge about how to produce and
distribute its product."11 Terrell applies this concept to
multinational banking, hypothesizing that in foreign mar-
kets, foreign banks can differentiate their products from
those of domestic competitors by specializing in services
to multinational firms from their home country. By spe-
cializing in such services, Terrell argues, Japanese banks'
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subsidiaries, agencies, and branches may enjoy a signifi-
cant competitive advantage over their domestic competi-
tors on account of their pre-existing business relationships
withJapanese firms, as wellas their superior knowledge of
Japan's markets, customs, and operations.
Thus, Terrell suggests that "rapid growth of foreign
branch and subsidiary activities byboth Japanese [banksin
America] and American banks [in Japan] indicates a
customer preference for obtaining banking services [in a
foreign country]-such as access to credit, deposit, and
payment facilities-from the office of a bank with which
they[already]are familiar [intheir home country]. . ." He
also asserts that "Customers much prefer this approach to
the alternatives of either dealing with a local institution
or, more expensively, dealing with a far-distant banking
facility."12
These assertions provide a testable hypothesis; namely,
that foreign banking activity is related to growth in trade
with a given foreign country, as well as strong local
economic conditions in the host country. Indeed, Ter-
rell finds such a positive correlation in his empirical
analysis. 13
The strong relationship Terrell found in the 1970s be-
tween international trade and foreign banking activity
appears to havebeen borne out in the 1980s. The surge in
trade between Japan and California appears to have in-
creased the demand for Japanese banking services in
California and the US.14 Chart 2A shows California's
combined volume of imports from and exports to Japan
from 1980 to 1987. The volume of trade increased by
nearly 150 percent during this period.t> Similarly, the
assets ofJapanese-owned banking institutions experienced
a surge in growth over this period, as shown in Chart 2B.
Moreover, just as Japan's trade with California came to
take up alarger share of California's total trade volume(35
percent in 1987, versus 30 percent in 1982), Japanese
banking assets in California also accounted for a larger
share of foreign banking assets in California by the end of
1987. (See Charts lA and lB.)
The British experience provides further support for the
viewthat increased trade helped to stimulate the growth of
Japanese banking assets in California. While commerce
with Japan has soared, British trade with California has
grown only slightly since 1982. (See Chart 2A.) By 1987,
California's $3.1 billion total trade with Britain was
Economic Review / Summer 1989dwarfedby the $41.1billion trade withJapan. Accordingto
the "banks followtrade" hypothesis, the lacklustergrowth
in British trade with California should have been associ-
ated with lackluster growth in British banking assets
during this period. In fact, as discussed earlier, theBritish
banks left the State. Thus, even though they held about 15
percent of California's commercial bank assets in 1982,
without growing trade flows to sustain them, a number of
years of subpar performances by their California banks
induced most of the British banks to sell their California
subsidiaries and invest elsewhere.
DirectForeignInvestment
Another factor that may have helped to stimulate the
rapid growth in Japanese banking assets in recent years is
the growth of Japan's external surpluses over most of this
period. Japan's large trade surpluses have made funds
available for direct foreign investment. Coupled with the
1980 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
TradeControlLaw, which deregulated capital flows into
andout of Japan, these trade surpluses have stimulated a
dramaticincrease in Japanese investment in the U.S. in
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7Over 700 Japanese firms have established manufactur-
ing operations in the U.S.; about one-quarter of those are
located in California." The bulk of the Japanese invest-
ment through 1986wasinmanufacturing, wholesale trade,
and real estate. Finance accounted forunder sevenpercent,
according to US. Commerce Department data.
According to Commerce Department data, by 1986,
Japan accounted for 14.2 percent of total direct foreign
investment in California, up from 9.1 percent in 1982. In
1986, Japan was second only to Canada in terms of direct
foreign investment in California, with $5.3..billion to
Canada's $6.0 billion. However, for Japan, there was a
129.1percent increase between 1982and 1986in the book
value of plant, property, and equipment invested in Cali-
fornia. Over the same period, Canada's increase was only
9.2 percent. The Japanese also surpassed Britain, which
slipped to third, despite a 63.6 percent increase in direct
foreign investment over the period.
This increase in direct investment probably has affected
the growth of Japanese banks in California both directly
and indirectly.The directeffects can be seen inthe stepped-
up pace of Japanese acquisitions of existing banks in
California. Another potential channel for increased direct
investment in California may havebeen increased funding
from the parent banks in Japan. Such funds could have
enabledJapanese banks in California to grow more rapidly
than their competitors.
Increased direct investment also may have provided an
indirect stimulus to Japanese banks in California through
increased demand for banking services on the part of
Japanese-owned commercial firms that have set up opera-
tions in California. As in the case of the "banks follow
trade" argument, banks also may follow investment since
Japanese investors probably prefer banking services pro-
vided by Japanese-owned banks with which they already
have established business relationships in Japan.
Other Factors
The strength of the California economy is another factor
that may have influenced Japanese bank expansion. In its
own right, Californiais alarge market. Its GDP ranks with
the top eight countries in the world. Its large size, good
location for international trade, and diversified base of
production offer banks an attractive market. In recent
years, the State's economy has outperformed the U.S.
economy,with more rapid growth and greaterresistance to
downturns, potentially making California more attractive
than other US. locations to foreign banks.
Thus, ifCalifornia's attractiveness asa market in itsown
right were a factor stimulating the growth of Japanese
8
banking in the State, one would expect to see Japanese-
owned banks and agencies and branches growing more
rapidly in California than in the US. generally or in the
New York and Chicago banking markets. Despite the
obvious Japanese interest in California, a comparison of
growth rates forJapanese-ownedbankinginstitutions from
1982to 1988indicates that Japanese-owned institutions in
the US. generally, and in New York and Illinois particu-
larly,grew at slightlyfasterrates than did Japanese-owned
banks in California. 17
Likewise, if California were particularly attractive as a
banking market in its own right, one might expect foreign
banks in general to grow rapidly in California. However,
this pattern is notobserved. As discussedabove, Japanese-
owned bankinginstitutions havegrown much more rapidly
than other foreign institutions. Charts lA and lB illustrate
the impact that differential growth rates have had on
market share. While the Japanese-owned banks havebeen
growing rapidly, other foreign-owned banks have been
leaving the market. In several cases, the Japanese have
acquired foreign-owned banks. The pattern also extendsto
the agencies and branches, where the Japanese institutions
have grown much more rapidly than the non-Japanese
institutions. Given these observations, theattractiveness of
the California market relative to other US. markets does
not appear to have been a major factor in the rapid growth
of Japanese-owned banks.
Diversification of geographic risks and access to U.S.
markets also may have been a stimulus for the growth of
Japanese banks in California. Specifically, entry into the
Californiamarket would provide access to the US. money
markets and diversify an international institution's funding
base by allowing it to raise funds in the large US. financial
markets. Similarly,operations in Californiaprovide access
to major corporate borrowers in theUS. and an opportuni-
ty todiversify lending risks across countries. However, this
may not be a particularly strong argument, since diver-
sification may be attained without access to California, or
even the US., for that matter.
One final explanation that has been offered for therapid
growth ofJapanese banks hastodowith potential competi-
tive advantages. Some argue, for example, that Japanese-
owned banks have access to funding and/or capital from
their parentbanks, which, because of their size and strong
credit ratings, can borrow at lower costs than can the
subsidiary (or than domestic banks)." This advantage,
moreover, may be reinforced by the availability of funds
associated with Japan's large external surpluses. Thus,
borrowing from an overseas parent could provide a fund-
ingadvantageforJapanese-owned subsidiary banks, agen-
cies, and branches. However,the parent must be willing to
Economic Review / Summer 1989forsake alternative open market returns on the funds in
favor of subsidizing the operations of its California af-
filiates.
In any event, Japanese banks are unlikely to haveany
significant funding advantagesovertheirdomesticrivalsin
domestic funding markets. It seems clear that within
California, Japanese banks price their retail deposits com-
petitively to survive in the retail market. And in the
wholesale markets, Japanese banks offercompetitiverates
on large CDs, federal funds, and eurodollars.
In sum, there are a number of factors that potentially
have stimulated the growth of Japanese banks in Califor-
nia. Based on the evidence considered in this section, it
appears that the growth in U.S. trade with Japan, the
increase in Japanese direct investment in the U.S., and
possibly, competitive advantages associated with using
Japanese parents as a funding source havebeen the major
reasons forthe growth of Japanese banks in California and
in the U.S. In the next section, I compare the portfolios of
Japanese-owned banks with those of domestically-owned
banks in California to determine whether investment
and/or fuuding patterns reflect these influences.
Chart 3
Business loans as
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III. A Comparison of Portfolios and Cost Structures
As discussed above, the dramatic increase in trade with domestically-owned banks in California. Specifically,
Japan and the growth in Japan's trade surpluses likelyhave Japanese-owned banks probably extend proportionately
been key reasons for the increase in the Japanese banking more business-oriented credit, including commercial real
presence in California. Trade financing is an area where estate loans, and proportionately less consumer-oriented
Japanese banks mayhaveacompetitive edge in lightofthis credit, including residential mortgage loans, than do
growth in trade and trade surpluses. Therefore, one might domestically-owned banks. Likewise, if direct investment
expect to find that Japanese banks have a larger market is a factor in Japanese-owned banks' growth, there could
share and extend moreof this type of credit as aproportion be differences in the composition of Japanese-owned
of assets than do domestic banks. Since trade financing and domestically-owned banks' liabilities. Specifically,
should appear on commercial banks' balance sheets as Japanese-owned banks may rely proportionately more on
business lending, commercial and industrial loans, com- borrowings from their parents and proportionately less
mercial letters of credit, and standby letters of credit on retail-oriented deposits than do domestically-owned
(SLCs) provide useful measures of market presence.'? banks.
Data on outstanding balances of commercial and indus-
trial loans and letters of credit show that Japanese-owned
banking institutions in California have, in fact, gained a
large share of these major commercial lending markets. In
business lending, Japanese-owned banking institutions
held 30.1 percent of the California market at year-end
1988. Their share of commercial letters of credit waseven
higher, nearly 32 percent. They controlled a 44 percent
share of the rapidly growing SLC market, which is dom-
inated by foreign banks with strong credit ratings.20
Clearly, then, Japanese banks in California have a strong
position in the markets for commercial lending and letters
ofcredit. This isconsistent withthe viewthatthegrowthin
Japanese-owned banks is associated withtheir tradeorien-
tation.
Aggregate Portfolio Measures
Other indications of Japanese banks' trade orientation
potentially may arise in comparisons of Japanese- and
domestically-ownedbanks' portfolios; thatis, if thegrowth
in Japanese-owned banks largely is the result of increased
trade, one might expect to see differences between the
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restrictions, it also provides support for the argument that
Japanese banks follow trade and thus are trade/business-
oriented. Thrift institutions inCalifornia traditionally have
not engaged in business finance and instead concentrate
primarily on household finance, an area in which Japanese
banks do not have a comparative advantage, according to
the "banks follow trade" argument.
In the aggregate, we also find that Japanese-owned
banks have a higher proportion of commercial real estate
loans than domestic banks have. At year-end 1988, Jap-
anese banks had 10.4 percent of their assets in commercial
real estate loans, versus only 6.7 percent for domestic
banks.
It is also interesting to note that while Japanese banks
havea higher proportion of business and commercial real
estate lending, there appear tobe nosignificant differences
in their relative proportions of total real estate lending (as
shown in Chart 4), single family real estate lending, or
consumer loans. Rather, as shown in Table 1, they have a
higher proportion of loans to assets, which is offset by a
smaller proportion of federal funds and repurchase agree-
ment lending, securities holdings, and other assets, which
mostly includes cash and balances due from other banks.
Deposit and liability data also tend to support the view
that Japanese banks are more wholesale-business oriented
than are their domestic counterparts. As can be seen in
Chart 5, in the aggregate, Japanese-ownedbanks primarily
are funded by domestic deposits, like their domestic bank
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Comparisons of ratios of various categories of loans to
total assets and ratios of various types of liabilities to total
assets are made. Percentages for aggregate data on all
Japanese-owned banks are compared with percentages for
aggregate data on all domestic banks. These percentages
are trackedover time, and presented inCharts 3through 7.
The aggregate data provide a measure of portfolio dif-
ferences between the bank groups, as well as a measure of
portfolio trends over time for each group. (However, these
are relative portfolio measures, scaled by assets; they
obscure differences in the actual growth rates ofthe asset
and deposit categories across bank groups. For example,
even though small time and savings deposits at Japanese-
owned banks have grown more rapidly than at domestic
banks, Chart 7shows thattheevenmorerapidexpansion of
Japanese bank assets has reduced the relative reliance on
small time and savings deposits as a funding source for the
Japanese banks.)
Aggregate data indicate that Japanese banks do have a
much higher proportion of commercial loans than domes-
tic banks have. While Japanese-owned banks held nearly
30 percent of their assets in business loans in 1988,
domestic banks held only 19.5 percent. Chart 3 indicates
that the difference between the two groups grew over the
period when trade with Japan was soaring. It also is
interesting to note that there are no Japanese-owned sav-
ings and loan associations or savingsbanks in California at
present. While this may be due in part to regulatory
10 Economic Review / Summer 1989Japanese-owned banks in California rely more heavilyon
jumbo CDs ($100,000 and over) than do domestic banks.
Moreover, Chart 6 shows that other borrowings, which
mayinclude federal funds, repurchase agreements, and
eurodollar borrowing, as well as borrowing from parent
banks, have been a more important source of funds for
Japanese-owned banks than for their domestic counter-
parts. Nonetheless, at present, as a percent of assets,
funding from parent banking organizations is not a partic-
ularlylargefunding source for Japanese subsidiary banks
in California. According to recent bank holding company
data, only about five percent of assets were funded this
way, and only one of the eight subsidiaries had a sig-
nificantly greater amount of borrowing from its parent.21
One reason is that most of the subsidiary banks view
such borrowing as a backup, rather than a primary,
source of funds. Finally,Chart 7 indicates that retail time
and savings deposits account for just over one-third of
Japanese-owned bank funding, versus closer to fifty per-
cent for domestic banks.
Thus, there are significant funding differences between
Japanese-owned banks and domestic banks. Japanese-
owned banks rely more on wholesale deposits and borrow-
ings and lesson retail deposits, consistent with the view
that they are more trade- and business-oriented.
Takentogether, then, the aggregate data on lending and
funding patterns roughly are consistent with the trade
patterns,lending support to the view that increased trade
and increased direct investment havebeen important stim-
uli to the growth of'.Japanese-owned banks in California.
Comparisons of Individual Bank Portfolios
However, these results could arise from individual
banks' •portfolio decisions, and could be unrelated to the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 11individualbanks' ownership status. Thus, itisimportantto
determine whether the difference is significant at the
individual bank levelafter controlling forother factors that
might influence portfolio composition. Analysis of the
individual bank data also may be necessary because the
sample of Japanese-owned banks is small, and the larger
institutions might skew the aggregate numbers.
Therefore, cross-sectional OLSQ regressions on indi-
vidual bank data are employed to identify statistically
significant portfolio differences between Japanese-owned
banks and other banks. Financial statement data are availa-
ble from the December 1987Call Reports for all commer-
cial banks in the state.22 A description of the regression
model is presented in the Appendix, and the results of the
regressions are presented in Tables I and 2.
At the individual bank level, the regression results are
consistent with the aggregate portfolio data. Controlling
for size and branch differences, Japanese banks have 10.2
percent more business loans on average than domestic
banks have. Moreover, that difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the one-percent level, as shown in Table 1.
Similarly, the cross-sectional regressions indicate that
commercial real estate lending at Japanese-owned banks
accounts for nearly seven percent more of the asset port-
folio than at domestic banks, and that the difference is
statistically significant at the one-percent level. As shown
in Table I, these findings are consistent with the view that
increases in trade and Japanese direct foreign investment
in California played a part in the expansion of Japanese
bank activity in the State.
12 Economic Review / Summer 1989Finally, at the individual bank level, differences in
funding patterns are statistically significant, and in some
cases these differences are also quite sizeable. Forexam-
ple,<as shown in Table 2, on average, Japanese-owned
banks were 12.2 percent more dependent on largeCDs and
7.4 percent more dependent on other borrowing for fund-





Percentage of Total Assets
Japanese Banks vs.
U. S. Owned Banks (California)
Cost Structures
This greater reliance on borrowed funds potentially
confers a cost advantage to Japanese-owned banks to
the extent that they can borrow more cheaply than can
domestically-owned banks, either because their parents in
Japanare subsidizing themor because their affiliationwith
their highly-rated parents enables them to borrow directly
at a lower cost. In the aggregate, the small proportion of
parent.funding probably dilutes any potential advantage
si~nificantly. Still, these portfolio measures donotrule out
the possibility that a "small" advantage might exist.
We cannot rule out the possibility of a funding advan-
tage from theportfolio data. However,ifparent banks were
willing to "subsidize" their California subsidiary banks,
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 13we would expect Japanese-owned banks to have a lower
cost of funds than their competitors.
Thus, it is useful to compare Japanese-owned and
domestically-owned banks' average cost of funds for two
categories of liabilities. The overall average costs of
interest-bearing funds and of other borrowings were esti-
mated using cross-sectional OLSQ regressionsfor 1988to
control forother factorsthat might influencebanks' costof
funds, such as size, number of branches, equity capital,
and growth over the past year. The results, presented in
Table 3, showno significantdifference betweenJapanese-
owned banks and domestic banks in either theoverallcost
of interest-bearing funds or the cost of other borrowings
(wbich includes the subsidiary banks' borrowing from
parents). These results tend to refute the argument that
Japanese banks have a funding advantage over domestic
banks'as aresult oftheir ability to rely on lowcostfunding
from-theirparents.
Related to potential funding advantages, it could be
argued that Japanese banks haveadvantages arising from
differential capital standards between Japan and the U.S.
However, recent agreements on international capital stan-
dards for banks should eliminate or reduce any potential
differences across countries.23
IV. How Will Japanese-Owned Banks Fare in the Future?
If the Japanese banks have an obvious competitive constant. However, unlike financing trade and the ac-
advantageinCalifornia, it is in theareaof providingtrade- tivities of foreign firms, there is no compelling evidence
related and commercial banking services. In this market that Japanese commercial banks have an advantage in
they can provide services that are tailored to the needs of providing retail banking services in California.
Japanese multinational business firms in California. Jap- Nonetheless, Japanese banks in California, as distinct
anese banks' knowledge of Japan's markets, customs, and from the agencies and branches, have demonstrated an
operations likely issuperiorto thatoftheirotherCalifornia interest in the "traditional retail banking field." A recent
competitors. American Banker reviewof Japanese banking in the State
Using this advantage, the assets of Japanese-owned suggests that the Japanese banks inCalifornia havebroad-
banks, agencies, and branches havegrown from under 11 ened their customer bases over time, expanding their
percent of the California total in 1982to over one-quarter provision of banking services to include a wider segment
of the state's banking assets and over thirty percent of ofthe market thanjust trade or theJapanese community. 24
commercial loans at year-end 1988. Moreover, the article suggests that many Japanese banks
Japanese-owned banks especially have grown rapidly are planning to extend their retail and middle market
during this period. Acquisitions of other foreign banks commercial lending business.
accounted for a large part of that growth. Prospects for Japanese-owned commercial banks already havea sig-
future acquisitions may be reduced somewhatby the lim- nificant investment in the "bricks and mortar" necessary
ited number of "independent" medium-sizedbanks inthe fora retail banking presence in theState. Over thelast five
State as well as the opening of banking in California years, the number of branches has grown, althoughnot as
to institutions headquartered anywhere in the country. fast as assets. Japanese-owned banks had 424 branches in
Japanese-owned commercial banks thus may find more December 1988, up from 247 in 1982. Their expanded
competition for acquisitions after 1991. Thus, they also branch network gives them a "delivery system" forretail
may find it difficult to continue increasing their market deposit services as well as for real estate lending, con-
share at the rapid pace of the last six years. sumer finance, middle market commercial lending, and
A slowdown in trade with Japan or direct Japanese even agricultural lending.
investment also could reduce the demand for the services This progression from trade finance to provision of
of Japanese-owned banking institutions and limit their banking services for the domestic market per se is not
growth. And theywill alwaysbe limited by thereality that unusual. Terrell noted such a trend in his 1979 article,
trade-related lending is only a small portion of the State's finding that it is consistent with Caves' theoretical frame-
total banking business. work concerning foreign investment.
Overtime,a movein the retail direction could minimize Thus, to remain competitive in the State in the future,
these limitations. It also would tend to minimize portfolio Japanese banks increasingly will need to compete directly
differences with domestic banks, if other factorsremained withthelarge domesticbanks. Andtheirfuture, likethatof
14 Economic Review / Summer 1989their competitors, will be greatly influenced by theState's
economic conditions and international economicdevelop-
ments.
California, and theU.S. generally,are obviouslyimpor-
tant markets to Japanese banks. It shouldbe notedthat the
opportunity to increase their size and market share has
come about as the result of acquisitions of other foreign-
ownedbanks disillusioned withtheirretailbankingexperi-
ence in the Golden State. Despitethe "warning" provided
by the departing British, the Japanese banks havemade a
sizable long-term commitment to the California banking
market, and they are likely to be an important factor in its
future. Moreover,to theextent that trade and direct invest-
ment remain at high levels, the Japanese banks will havea
base for operations that the British apparently lacked.
Appendix
The dependent variables in Tables 1 and 2 are the tobe involved in major corporate financing. Furthermore,
individual asset or liability categories as a percentage of differences in the size mix also may be important across
assets. The regressions are estimated across banks, con- ownership groups, especially since the Japanese subsidi-
trolling for ownership by using dummy variablesfor Jap- ary banks are relatively large compared to most domestic
anese ownership and for other foreign ownership. Two banks.
other control variables and an error term also areincluded The number of branches for each bank is also included
in the model. The model appears robust, in that similar as a control variable because of possible portfolio dif-
results are generated by adding a control variableforbank ferences arising from branch structure. California is a
growth over the prior year and by dropping the size and statewide branching state, and the State's 442 banks oper-
branch control variables altogether. ate around 5,000 offices. These branch networks generate
Asset size is included as a control variable because retail deposits and retail lending opportunities andconsid-
banks in the State range from very large multinationalsto erable overhead expenses. Different branching patterns
very small local banks, and size mayaffecttheir asset and between the ownership groups could account for some of
liability composition. For example, only large banks are the variationbetween groups, especially in termsof access
likelytobe able to borrowdirectly inthemoneymarketsor to retail deposits and retail lending.
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1. Principal Accounts of Overseas Branches of Japanese
Banks, at year-end, 1981 through 1987. Japan Financial
Statistics, Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan,
1989, page 26.
2. Includes total foreign and domestic assets of Jap-
anese-owned banks, subsidiary banks, agencies, and
branches (including Edge Act Corporations). Year-end
1988 data from the December 31,1988, Call Report.
3. Year-end 1988 Call Report data for California banks.
4. Japanese banks have made a significant financial
commitment to penetrating the California market. To-
gether, Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi, and Sanwa have in-
vested upwards of $1.3 billion in California acquisitions.
CaliforniaFirst(owned by BankofTokyo)paid $750 million
to acquire Union Bank in October 1988. Sanwa Bank
of California paid $263 million to acquire Lloyds Bank
California in 1986. Mitsubishi paid $242.5 million to ac-
quire BanCal Tri-State Corp. in 1984. American Banker,
6-20-84, 1-20-87, and 7-20-88.
5. As of 12-31-88, Mitsui Manufacturers Bank ranked
twelfth in the State with $1.6 billion in assets and Tokai
Bank of California, with $939 million in assets, ranked
twentieth. Tokai had ranked tenth through much of 1988.
Two other banks aresubsidiaries ofJapanese banks, Dai-
Ichi Kangyo Bank, $353 million inassets at year-end 1988,
and Kyowa Bank of California, $114 million in assets.
American Pacific State Bank, $165 million in assets, and
Los Angeles National Bank, $60 million in assets, are also
Japanese-owned, but are not owned by banks.
6. International Banking Facility (IBF) assets, which are
limited to transactions with foreign residents, account for
nearly half of the total foreign agency and branch assets
nationally. See FederalReserve Bulletin, Assets and Lia-
bilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks,
June 30, 1988, page A78.
7. For example, see Richard W. Wright and Gunter A.
Pauli's The Second Wave: Japan's Global Assault on
Financial services, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1987,
page 1.
8. See footnote 2 for the market definition.
9. The market share of the non-Japanese foreign-owned
banking institutions fell from 20.1 percent in 1982 to 6.5
percent at year-end 1988, primarily as a result of the
British retreat from California. British banks controlled
about15percent ofthe assets of banking institutions inthe
State at the beginning of the period.
10. Terrell's (1979) study analyzes international banking
on a bilateral basis. He examines the growth of foreign
branch and subsidiary activities of both Japanese and
American banks inthe context of foreign investment. Data
for these countries lend themselves to comparisons of
banking and trade in local markets because most of the
banking activities of these two countries are primarily
either for the local market or are trade related.
11. Terrell's interpretation of Caves' basic assumption.
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12. See Terrell, (1979), page 18.
13. SeeTerrell, (1979), page 26.
14. This process, in fact, closely parallels the expansion
of U.S-: banks overseas a generation earlier, when U.S.
multinational firms were experiencing rapid overseas
growth. See Terrell (1979).
15. Source: Commerce Department. Foreign Trade Sta-
tisticsReport:Waterborne Trade, year-end totals. Imports:
Report SM305, Exports: Report SM705.
16. From "Japan's Expanding U.S. Manufacturing Pres-
ence: .1987 Update," JEI Report, Japan Economic Insti-
tute, December 16, 1988, page 3.
17 .•·Totalassets ofJapanese-owned banks, agencies and
branches in the U.S. increased by 216.0 percent over the
period from 1982 to 1988. The increase in New Yorkwas
226.3 percent. In California, the increase was only 170.1
percent.
18. Testimony presented at a Special Joint Hearing on
Foreign Investment inCalifornia: Banking and RealEstate,
California Legislature, January 25, 1989.
19. SLCs are essentially financial guarantees sold by
large, creditworthy banks. Commercial and industrial
loans provide a potentially cleaner measure of market
share than assets because interbank transactions may
bias assets upwards and inflate market shares.
20. For example, of the ten largest SLC-issuing Jap-
anese-owned agencies in California in May 1988, eight
held Moody's best rating, Aaa, for long-term and senior
debt. The two remaining Japanese-owned agencies had
third highest ratings of Aa2. In contrast, of the top four
domestic banks in the State in May 1988, none had the
highest rating. One had the next highest, Aa1,two had the
third highest, Aa2, and the fourth had a rating of Baa2.
Moody's Credit Opinions, Moody's Investors Service,
New York, May 1988.
21. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of SanFrancisco, BHC
Reports, December 31,1987. Y-8 Report.
22. 1987 data were used because the late-1988 acquisi-
tion of Union Bank (British-owned) by Japanese-owned
California First Bank may have distorted the "Japanese"
bank portfolio. Union Bank's assets were equal to nearly
one quarter of all Japanese bank assets at the time the
merger took place, and to the extent that Union's portfolio
was determined by the former British owners, portfolio
measures would tend to reflect British ownership rather
than Japanese ownership.
23. Also, all banks chartered inthe U.S., including foreign
subsidiary banks, are subject to U.S. capital standards.
24. AmericanBanker, "Japanese BanksTackleCalifornia
Middle Market," September 10,1987, and "Bank of Tokyo
Targets California's Middle Market," February 19, 1988.
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